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OPINION
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Darren Johnson, a state prisoner, appeals: (1) the district court’s grant of Martin
Horn’s Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss an Eighth Amendment claim
asserted against him by Johnson; (2) the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Drs. Moyer and Stempler on an Eighth Amendment claim asserted against them by
Johnson; (3) the district court’s denial of two of Johnson’s motions for appointment of
counsel; and (4) the district court’s denial of Johnson’s Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(2) motion.
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For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the district court’s grant of Horn’s motion, the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to Drs. Moyer and Stempler and the district
court’s denial of two of Johnson’s motions for the appointment of counsel. However, we
will vacate the district court’s denial of the Rule 60(b)(2) motion and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
Inasmuch as we are writing primarily for the parties who are familiar with this
case, we need not recite the factual or procedural background of this case, except insofar
as is helpful to our discussion.

A.
Johnson makes a number of arguments in challenging the district court’s dismissal
of his complaint. First, he contends that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment to Drs. Moyer and Stempler on his Eighth Amendment claim.1 We disagree. In

1

The Eighth Amendment, through its prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment,
imposes a duty on prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement,
including adequate medical treatment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A
violation of the Amendment occurs when (1) a medical need is serious and (2) the acts or
omissions by prison officials demonstrate “deliberate indifference” to the inmate’s health
or safety. See Id., at 106; Monmouth County Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834
F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court has clarified this “deliberate
indifference” standard, explaining that is a subjective test, meaning the official must
actually know of and disregard an excessive risk to the health of the inmate. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994).
A medical need will be considered “serious” if it is “one that has been diagnosed
by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would
easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Lanzaro, 834 F.3d at 347.
3

its thorough and well-reasoned opinion, dated January 5, 2005, the district court explained
why Drs. Moyer and Stempler were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Johnson’s
Eighth Amendment claim. 2005 WL 119575 at *3-5. We can add little, if anything, to
the district court’s analysis and discussion. Accordingly, we will affirm the dismissal of
Johnson’s Eighth Amendment claim against those doctors substantially for the reasons set
forth in the opinion of the district court.
B.

Under Estelle, deliberate indifference is present when prison officials intentionally
deny or delay access to necessary medical treatment for non-medical reasons, or when
they interfere with a course of treatment once prescribed. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05;
Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). Medical judgments by doctors or
prison officials that later prove inappropriate or negligent, however, are not alone
sufficient to give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Estelle, at 106-07. Stated
simply, inadequate medical practice is not a constitutional violation. Id. Accordingly,
even when some medical care is administered by officials that arguably falls below the
generally accepted standard of care, that medical care is generally sufficient to rebut
accusations of deliberate indifference and preclude a finding of an Eighth Amendment
violation. See, e.g., Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir.
1990) (stating that prison officials and doctors will be given wide latitude to address the
medical needs of inmates and that “as long as a physician exercises professional
judgment his behavior will not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.”).
A local governmental agency may be a “person” for purposes of § 1983 liability.
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Liability of such entities may
not rest on respondeat superior, but rather must be based on a governmental policy,
practice, or custom that caused the injury. Id. at 690-94. The same standard applies to a
private health care provider that is acting under color of state law. See, e.g., Anacata v.
Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir. 1985).
Finally, private prison doctors working under contract with the government act
“under color of state law” for purposes of § 1983. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-57
(1988).
4

Second, Johnson contends that the district court erred in granting a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal of his Eighth Amendment claim against Secretary Horn in his individual
capacity. In doing so, Johnson concedes that § 1983 liability cannot be imposed
vicariously or on the basis of respondeat superior. Johnson’s Br. at 38 (citing Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). He claims, however, that he asserted
that Horn was personally involved in “establishing and enforcing policies and practices
related to his claim.” Id.
Given Horn’s alleged status as a policymaker, Johnson contends that Horn cannot
escape that liability by contracting with private companies such as PHS or CPS. In
Johnson’s view, the delay in his receipt of knee surgery (the essence of his Eighth
Amendment claim) is traceable to the deficient PHS or CPS policies, which in turn are
traceable to deficient DOC policies that Horn was responsible for. Thus, according to
Johnson, Horn is personally liable for any delay in receiving surgery.
Johnson bases his argument on West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-57 (1988) and
Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 705-06 (11th Cir. 1985). However,
West does not support his argument at all. West established that private prison doctors
working under contract with the government act “under color of state law” for purposes
of § 1983 and may be sued under that statute. 487 U.S. at 54-57. However, the Court did
not address whether the head of an agency can he personally liable for a contract doctor’s
alleged malfeasance.
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Johnson fares no better under Ancata. There, the personal representative of the
estate of the deceased prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a county, two sheriffs and
a private entity under contract with the county to provide medical care to inmates. The
plaintiff asserted an Eighth Amendment claim alleging deliberate indifference to the
prisoner’s serious medical needs. The district court dismissed all claims against all the
defendants. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that local governments have an
obligation to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals and that this duty is not
absolved by contracting with a private entity to provide medical care. The local
government’s duty to provide medical care was non-delegable and liability remained with
the local government, not under the theory of respondeat superior, but because the policy
of the private entity became the policy of the local government. 769 F.2d at 705-06.
Here, however, Johnson is not asserting a claim against a local governmental
agency. His claim is against Horn personally. Thus, Ancata does not support Johnson’s
contention that Horn is personally liable for the allegedly deficient policies of PHS and
CPS.
Admittedly, in Ancata, the two sheriffs were kept in the case because the details of
their personal involvement in the events at issue were unclear from the pleadings. Id., at
706. However, the record here clearly demonstrates that Horn had absolutely nothing to
do with decisions about Johnson’s treatment. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
dismissing Johnson’s Eighth Amendment claim against Horn.
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C.
Third, Johnson argues that the district court erred by refusing to appoint counsel
for him prior to dismissing his Eighth Amendment claims against Drs. Moyer and
Stempler and Secretary Horn. “Indigent civil litigants possess neither a constitutional nor
a statutory right to appointed counsel.” Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 498 (3d
Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Nonetheless, Congress has granted district courts the
authority to “request” appointed counsel for indigent civil litigants. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(1) (providing that “[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any person
unable to afford counsel”). District courts have “broad discretion” to determine whether
appointment of counsel in a civil case would be appropriate. Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d
147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993). In Tabron, we concluded that the decision to appoint counsel
may be made at any point in the litigation, and may be made by a district court sua sponte.
Id. at 156.
In Tabron, we articulated a list of factors to assist the district courts in deciding
whether to appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants. As a threshold matter, the district
court must determine whether the indigent plaintiff’s case has some arguable merit in fact
and law. Id. at 155. “If the district court determines that the plaintiff’s claim has
arguable merit in fact and law, the court should then consider a number of additional
factors that bear on the need for appointed counsel.” Id. These include: (1) the plaintiff’s
ability to present his or her own case; (2) the difficulty of the particular legal issues; (3)
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the degree to which factual investigation will be necessary and the ability of the plaintiff
to pursue investigation; (4) the plaintiff’s capacity to retain counsel on his or her behalf;
(5) the extent to which a case is likely to turn on credibility determinations; and (6)
whether the case will require testimony from expert witnesses. Id. at 155-57.
We have noted that “[t]his list of factors is not exhaustive, but instead should serve
as a guidepost for the district courts.” Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 458 (3d Cir.
1997). Finally, we have cautioned that district courts “should exercise care in appointing
counsel because volunteer lawyer time is a precious commodity and should not be wasted
on frivolous cases.” Id. (citation omitted).
In denying Johnson’s first two motions for the appointment of counsel, the district
court said:
Five law firms or attorneys have previously declined to
represent [Johnson] in this case, and at least two of these
rejections were based on the merits. After considering this
fact, the Court, on October 22, 2001, ordered the Pro Se Writ
Clerk to cease further efforts to appoint counsel in this matter.
Efforts to appoint counsel that result in two rejections on the
merits fulfill the requirements of the Prisoner Civil Rights
Panel Program. “Where, in succession, two attorneys or law
firms decline to accept a case after reviewing it thoroughly on
the merits, no further request for representation shall be made
unless there appear to be exceptional circumstances, such as
plaintiff’s serious mental or physical disability.” Prisoner
Civil Rights Panel Program Description at 2 (approved by the
Board of Judges in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania on December 20, 1993).
Here, there is no evidence of serious mental or physical
disability or any other exceptional circumstance.
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Johnson does not argue that he was suffering from a serious mental or physical disability
or that any other exceptional circumstance existed that would warrant the appointment of
counsel when the district court rejected his motions. Moreover, as we noted in Tabron:
We have no doubt that there are many cases in which district
courts seek to appoint counsel but there is simply no one
willing to accept appointment. It is difficult to fault a district
court that denies a request for appointment under such
circumstances.
6 F.3d at 157 (footnote omitted).
Given the circumstances here, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its
discretion in denying Johnson’s first two motions for appointment of counsel.
D.
Fourth, and finally, Johnson argues that the district court erred in denying his Rule
60(b)(2) motion based on its finding that the motion was untimely filed. Rule 60(b)(2)
allows a district court to relieve a party “from a final judgment” based on “newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b). However, such a motion must be brought within
one year from the entry of the judgment.
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Prison Health Services on
January 18, 2005. After Johnson had counsel, his attorney reviewed the Asset Purchase
Agreement between Correctional Physician Services and Prison Health Services, and filed
a Rule 60(b)(2) motion on March 1, 2006, contending that Prison Health Services had
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assumed the liabilities of Correctional Physician Services under the Asset Purchase
Agreement. The district court denied the motion on October 5, 2006, finding that it was
filed beyond the one-year time limitation. However, Rule 60(b) applies only to final
judgments and the one-year time limitation imposed by the Rule does not apply to
situations where the order in question was not properly appealable in the first place. The
January 18, 2005, order granting summary judgment to Prision Health Services was not
final because it did not dispose of all issues as to all parties. Therefore, the fact that
Johnson filed his Rule 60(b) motion more than a year after the entry of that order is of no
consequence. Accordingly, the district court erred by denying the motion as untimely.
We will, therefore, vacate the October 5, 2006, order and remand with instructions that
the district court consider the merits of Johnson’s arguments concerning Prison Health
Services liability under the Asset Purchase Agreement.

IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, we will affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Drs. Moyer and Stempler on Johnson’s Eight Amendment Claim as well as
the district court’s grant of Horn’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss of Johnson’s Eight
Amendment claim asserted against him. We will also affirm the district court’s June 2,
2003 denial of Johnson’s January 21, 2003, and May 13, 2003, motions for appointment
of counsel. However, we will vacate the district court’s denial of Johnson’s Rule
60(b)(2) motion and will remand for the district court to consider the merits of Johnson’s
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arguments concerning Prison Health Services’ liability under the Asset Purchase
Agreement.
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